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flight_crew_and_loss_of_control [2012/03/19 20:58] tom |
flight_crew_and_loss_of_control [2012/03/21 01:59] tom |
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There were no stated reasons in the C.A.B Report, Page 15, as to why **"...a shift of loading caused by the passengers moving to the aft end of the cabin..."** is mentioned. | There were no stated reasons in the C.A.B Report, Page 15, as to why **"...a shift of loading caused by the passengers moving to the aft end of the cabin..."** is mentioned. | ||
- | Also, there is no mention as to the discovery of seat belts or seat belt buckles and whether or not any were found fastened or unfastened in the wreckage. | + | Also, there is no mention as to the discovery of seat belts or seat belt buckles and whether or not any were found fastened or unfastened in the wreckage. |
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====The Possible Role Of Intense Heat and Smoke==== | ====The Possible Role Of Intense Heat and Smoke==== | ||
- | One of the most puzzling aspects of this tragedy is that there was no radio contact with Flight 823 after the crew cancelled the Instrument Flight Plan and went to a Visual Flight Plan at 1802:45. The last radio transmission was the "OK" at 1802:55. | + | It is my opinion that the Flight crew lost control of the aircraft because of the large amounts of thick smoke and intense heat from the fire. |
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+ | The moment Flight 823 deviated from the Victor 16 Airway is when I believe the fire started in the passenger cabin. | ||
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+ | According to the C.A.B report, **"All three supercharger spill valves actuators were found with their actuating rods in the "supercharge spill" position. This setting would dump supercharger air overboard rather than using it to pressurize the cabin...The interior locking mechanisms for the No. 4 and No. 9 windows on the left side were in the unlocked position | ||
- | The [[http://ntl1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=S%3A\DOT_56GB\airplane%20accidents\websearch\070964.pdf|Civil Aeronautics Board Aircraft Accident Report]] Page 10 states that **"The aircraft should have been at approximately 11,000 feet and about 24 miles southwest of Holston Mountain when they cancelled their IFR flight plan."** | ||
- | **"At some point during the descent, the aircraft deviated to the south of Victor 16 but was proceeding approximately parallel to the airway. No reason can be assigned to this deviation...The aircraft appeared to be following a nearby river, in a descent, and was about 8 miles south of the airway (V16) centerline. Three miles further along the flight path, at approximately 1810, the aircraft ws observed about 500 feet above the ground. The aircraft continued to operate at very low altitudes and well to the left of the airway from this point on to the crash."** | ||