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flight_crew_and_loss_of_control [2012/03/21 01:59]
tom
flight_crew_and_loss_of_control [2012/03/21 11:41]
tom
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 To be sure, the tests made on the clothing that belonged to the man who jumped from the aircraft contributed a great deal in changing the minds of those who believed the fire took place in the electrical compartment. (I will devote a whole section to the man who jumped from the plane). However, it is interesting to note the assumption //that a leak that sprayed hydraulic fluid onto a hot electrical terminal as being the cause for the fire that damaged the flight control rods// was to become something less than what was previously considered. To be sure, the tests made on the clothing that belonged to the man who jumped from the aircraft contributed a great deal in changing the minds of those who believed the fire took place in the electrical compartment. (I will devote a whole section to the man who jumped from the plane). However, it is interesting to note the assumption //that a leak that sprayed hydraulic fluid onto a hot electrical terminal as being the cause for the fire that damaged the flight control rods// was to become something less than what was previously considered.
  
-From [[http://​ntl1.specialcollection.net/​scripts/​ws.dll?​file&​fn=8&​name=S%3A\DOT_56GB\airplane%20accidents\websearch\070964.pdf|Civil Aeronautics Board Aircraft Accident Report]] Pages 13-14: **"As previously stated there was extensive fire damage in the electrical bay. However, this fact alone cannot be considered significant. This area in the Viscount, as in the majority of low configured aircraft, is in close proximity to and between the fuel tanks. Thus, in a breakup, this is a likely area to receive a substantial quantity of spilled fuel and in turn to be heavily damaged by post impact fire. This fire damage pattern has been observed in many accidents where post impact fire occurred. The somewhat conflicting soot and discoloration patterns observed on certain isolated pieces from the electric bay area dictated further considerations with respect to inflight fire. The only likely source of overtemperature ​in this compartment is a gross electrical fault to ground. The emergency procedure executed by the crew does not support a gross electrical system malfunction. An electrical source smoke or fire emergency is combated by turning the emergency power switch on and placing the battery master switch and generators off. Equipment that was operating at impact and DME operation to five miles before impact shows that this particular emergency procedure had not been executed."​**+From [[http://​ntl1.specialcollection.net/​scripts/​ws.dll?​file&​fn=8&​name=S%3A\DOT_56GB\airplane%20accidents\websearch\070964.pdf|Civil Aeronautics Board Aircraft Accident Report]] Pages 13-14: **"As previously stated there was extensive fire damage in the electrical bay. However, this fact alone cannot be considered significant. This area in the Viscount, as in the majority of low configured aircraft, is in close proximity to and between the fuel tanks. Thus, in a breakup, this is a likely area to receive a substantial quantity of spilled fuel and in turn to be heavily damaged by post impact fire. This fire damage pattern has been observed in many accidents where post impact fire occurred. The somewhat conflicting soot and discoloration patterns observed on certain isolated pieces from the electric bay area dictated further considerations with respect to inflight fire. The only likely source of over temperature ​in this compartment is a gross electrical fault to ground. The emergency procedure executed by the crew does not support a gross electrical system malfunction. An electrical source smoke or fire emergency is combated by turning the emergency power switch on and placing the battery master switch and generators off. Equipment that was operating at impact and DME operation to five miles before impact shows that this particular emergency procedure had not been executed."​**
  
 **"​Historically,​ under-the-floor fires that have persisted to a catastrophic stage have burned through the relatively light fuselage belly skin, have been observed by witnesses when present, and have left a path of partially burned debris on the ground. This did not happen in this case."​** **"​Historically,​ under-the-floor fires that have persisted to a catastrophic stage have burned through the relatively light fuselage belly skin, have been observed by witnesses when present, and have left a path of partially burned debris on the ground. This did not happen in this case."​**
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 The moment Flight 823 deviated from the Victor 16 Airway is when I believe the fire started in the passenger cabin. ​ The moment Flight 823 deviated from the Victor 16 Airway is when I believe the fire started in the passenger cabin. ​
  
-According to the C.A.B report, **"All three supercharger spill valves actuators were found with their actuating rods in the "​supercharge spill" position. This setting would dump supercharger air overboard rather than using it to pressurize the cabin...The interior locking mechanisms for the No. 4 and No. 9 windows on the left side were in the unlocked position+According to the C.A.B report ​Page 10, **"All three supercharger spill valves actuators were found with their actuating rods in the "​supercharge spill" position. This setting would dump supercharger air overboard rather than using it to pressurize the cabin...The interior locking mechanisms for the No. 4 and No. 9 windows on the left side were in the unlocked position, and the pilot'​s direct vision (DV) window was found unlocked and partially open. 
  
 +It should be noted that No. 9 window was located in an area closer to the wreckage, having fallen after the free fall victim had exited the aircraft and before the crash. A British Aircraft Corporation memorandum reports that it was found 1/3 of a mile from the crash site.
  
 +Lab results, which will be discussed later, claim that tests on the free fall victims clothing, and burns which he suffered show that the amount of  heat inside the aircraft was hotter after he left the aircraft, thus, in my opinion, the Captain lost consciousness and control of the aircraft.
  
 +The C.A.B report summary lists another possible scenario as "pilot distraction"​ being a reason for loss of control. This can be weighed and considered also. 
  
 +However, it is not hard to imagine that the entirety of the last few minutes prior to the crash had to have been full of distractions. ​
  
 +The lack of radio communications is a great indicator of his being distracted.
 +
 +Performing such tasks as opening cockpit windows and taking fire extinguishing measures, while having the presence of mind to operate the aircraft, indicates to me that, despite distractions characteristic of what proved to be an impossible situation, he lost consciousness due to heat and smoke. ​
 +
 +I'm not certain that exposure to high levels of CO2 would have permitted him to take the measures that he did. 
  
-Article not completed 
  
 [[start|United Flight 823]] [[start|United Flight 823]]
flight_crew_and_loss_of_control.txt ยท Last modified: 2012/04/02 00:24 by tom