the_flight_crew_and_loss_of_control
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the_flight_crew_and_loss_of_control [2013/12/02 12:37] tom |
the_flight_crew_and_loss_of_control [2014/12/24 21:50] tom |
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| Although there are at least three distinct theories, there can be no solid conclusion as to how or why the pilot lost control of the aircraft. One Internet website, [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_823|Wikipedia]], makes the statement that the flight crew was overcome by CO2 and lost control of the plane after losing consciousness. While this is a possibility, it can not be stated as fact. In my opinion, much of the information posted in the brief Wikipedia article is inaccurate. | Although there are at least three distinct theories, there can be no solid conclusion as to how or why the pilot lost control of the aircraft. One Internet website, [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_823|Wikipedia]], makes the statement that the flight crew was overcome by CO2 and lost control of the plane after losing consciousness. While this is a possibility, it can not be stated as fact. In my opinion, much of the information posted in the brief Wikipedia article is inaccurate. | ||
| - | The supposition that the flight crew was overcome by CO2, in my opinion, arises from an October 9, 1964 letter from the Civil Aeronautics Board Bureau of Safety to Mr. George Moore, Director of Flight Standards Service for the F.A.A. The letter can be read in its entirety as "Attachment #2" in the [[http://ntl1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?websearch&site=dot_aircraftacc|Civil Aeronautics Board Aircraft Accident Report]]. | + | The supposition that the flight crew was overcome by CO2, in my opinion, arises from an October 9, 1964 letter from the Civil Aeronautics Board Bureau of Safety to Mr. George Moore, Director of Flight Standards Service for the F.A.A. The letter can be read in its entirety as "Attachment #2" in the [[http://unitedflight823.s3.amazonaws.com/united-accident-report.pdf|Civil Aeronautics Board Aircraft Accident Report]]. |
| The letter notifies Mr. Moore of static and inflight tests performed on similar Viscount aircraft fire extinguishing systems for the underfloor cargo compartments; the results of which concluded that there were **"certain discrepancies which could seriously affect the safety of the aircraft and passengers".** | The letter notifies Mr. Moore of static and inflight tests performed on similar Viscount aircraft fire extinguishing systems for the underfloor cargo compartments; the results of which concluded that there were **"certain discrepancies which could seriously affect the safety of the aircraft and passengers".** | ||
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| - | It is important to note that the date that the [[http://ntl1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?websearch&site=dot_aircraftacc | Civil Aeronautics Board Aircraft Accident Report]]was adopted June 2, 1966. This is almost two years after the C.A.B's Bureau of Safety expressed concerns to the F.A.A Flight Standards Service about the possible risks associated with CO2 entering the cockpit by way of the forward cargo compartment. | + | It is important to note that the date that the [[http://unitedflight823.s3.amazonaws.com/united-accident-report.pdf | Civil Aeronautics Board Aircraft Accident Report]]was adopted June 2, 1966. This is almost two years after the C.A.B's Bureau of Safety expressed concerns to the F.A.A Flight Standards Service about the possible risks associated with CO2 entering the cockpit by way of the forward cargo compartment. |
| The risks of CO2 had to have been considered by the Board yet, they were not mentioned in the final conclusion that read, **"In examining the final maneuver and crash, it is apparent that the aircraft was not under control of the crew. There are a number of hypotheses that can be advanced to explain this loss of control including: distraction of the pilot; failure of the flight control rods due to fire damage; incapacitation of the pilot by heat and/or smoke, a shift of loading caused by passengers moving to the aft end of the cabin; an overt act by some person aboard the aircraft, or any combination of these.** | The risks of CO2 had to have been considered by the Board yet, they were not mentioned in the final conclusion that read, **"In examining the final maneuver and crash, it is apparent that the aircraft was not under control of the crew. There are a number of hypotheses that can be advanced to explain this loss of control including: distraction of the pilot; failure of the flight control rods due to fire damage; incapacitation of the pilot by heat and/or smoke, a shift of loading caused by passengers moving to the aft end of the cabin; an overt act by some person aboard the aircraft, or any combination of these.** | ||
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| To be sure, the tests made on the clothing that belonged to the man who jumped from the aircraft contributed a great deal in changing the minds of those who believed the fire took place in the electrical compartment. (I will devote a whole section to the man who jumped from the plane). However, it is interesting to note the assumption //that a leak that sprayed hydraulic fluid onto a hot electrical terminal as being the cause for the fire that damaged the flight control rods// was to become something less than what was previously considered. | To be sure, the tests made on the clothing that belonged to the man who jumped from the aircraft contributed a great deal in changing the minds of those who believed the fire took place in the electrical compartment. (I will devote a whole section to the man who jumped from the plane). However, it is interesting to note the assumption //that a leak that sprayed hydraulic fluid onto a hot electrical terminal as being the cause for the fire that damaged the flight control rods// was to become something less than what was previously considered. | ||
| - | From [[http://ntl1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?websearch&site=dot_aircraftacc|Civil Aeronautics Board Aircraft Accident Report]] Pages 13-14: **"As previously stated there was extensive fire damage in the electrical bay. However, this fact alone cannot be considered significant. This area in the Viscount, as in the majority of low configured aircraft, is in close proximity to and between the fuel tanks. Thus, in a breakup, this is a likely area to receive a substantial quantity of spilled fuel and in turn to be heavily damaged by post impact fire. This fire damage pattern has been observed in many accidents where post impact fire occurred. The somewhat conflicting soot and discoloration patterns observed on certain isolated pieces from the electric bay area dictated further considerations with respect to inflight fire. The only likely source of over temperature in this compartment is a gross electrical fault to ground. The emergency procedure executed by the crew does not support a gross electrical system malfunction. An electrical source smoke or fire emergency is combated by turning the emergency power switch on and placing the battery master switch and generators off. Equipment that was operating at impact and DME operation to five miles before impact shows that this particular emergency procedure had not been executed."** | + | From [[http://unitedflight823.s3.amazonaws.com/united-accident-report.pdf|Civil Aeronautics Board Aircraft Accident Report]] Pages 13-14: **"As previously stated there was extensive fire damage in the electrical bay. However, this fact alone cannot be considered significant. This area in the Viscount, as in the majority of low configured aircraft, is in close proximity to and between the fuel tanks. Thus, in a breakup, this is a likely area to receive a substantial quantity of spilled fuel and in turn to be heavily damaged by post impact fire. This fire damage pattern has been observed in many accidents where post impact fire occurred. The somewhat conflicting soot and discoloration patterns observed on certain isolated pieces from the electric bay area dictated further considerations with respect to inflight fire. The only likely source of over temperature in this compartment is a gross electrical fault to ground. The emergency procedure executed by the crew does not support a gross electrical system malfunction. An electrical source smoke or fire emergency is combated by turning the emergency power switch on and placing the battery master switch and generators off. Equipment that was operating at impact and DME operation to five miles before impact shows that this particular emergency procedure had not been executed."** |
| **"Historically, under-the-floor fires that have persisted to a catastrophic stage have burned through the relatively light fuselage belly skin, have been observed by witnesses when present, and have left a path of partially burned debris on the ground. This did not happen in this case."** | **"Historically, under-the-floor fires that have persisted to a catastrophic stage have burned through the relatively light fuselage belly skin, have been observed by witnesses when present, and have left a path of partially burned debris on the ground. This did not happen in this case."** | ||
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| Also, there is no mention as to the discovery of seat belts or seat belt buckles and whether or not any were found fastened or unfastened in the wreckage. | Also, there is no mention as to the discovery of seat belts or seat belt buckles and whether or not any were found fastened or unfastened in the wreckage. | ||
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| + | ==UPDATE== I've given the seat belt buckles much thought and have come to the conclusion that, if the buckles found in the wreckage had been in the fastened position, there would not have been cause for the CAB to consider that a shift in passenger load had occurred. This is not to say that a load shift was the definitive cause of the plane losing control, only that it is likely passengers in the front of the plane got up from their seats in order to distance themselves from the fire. A fair conclusion can be reached that a good number of seat belt buckles were not found in the wreckage in the fastened position. | ||
the_flight_crew_and_loss_of_control.txt ยท Last modified: 2014/12/24 21:52 by tom
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